Markets for professional services: queues and mediocrity

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Abstract

We analyze a dynamic, decentralized market with endogenous entry, where in each period the active professionals supply one unit of an indivisible service at varying degrees of quality. The customers that have entered the market are randomly matched with the active professionals and prices are set by (complete information) pair-wise bargaining. In its unique steady state, the market leads to an excess diversity of quality and customers may have to suffer costly delays. Notably, efficiency is not regained as per period delay costs disappear. We also show that a professional college setting licensing rules will improve welfare (and even Consumer Surplus), relative to the free market, whenever the inefficiency is caused by a large enough excess supply.

1 Introduction

The services of architects, accountants, lawyers and other liberal professionals play a major role in the performance of advanced industrialized economies. According to recent estimates, professional services employ about 6.4% of the EU15 work-force and represent 10% of overall high skill employment; in 2001 the sector had turnover of around 980 billion Euros and created around 500 billion Euros of total value added. Professional services are

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1See the report on Competition in Professional services COM (2004) 83.
an intermediate input for many other activities, so that their quality and competitiveness have major spill over effects across the economy.\footnote{For example, according to recent estimate by the Italian Antitrust Authority, 6\% of the costs in Italian exporting firms are due to professional services.} Thus enhancing efficiency in markets for professional services can go a long way in improving other industries’ competitiveness and fostering growth.

The sector of professional business services is characterized by a very high level of regulation. While specific regulations vary across countries and professions, quality standards, advertising constraints, price limits or other controls are extensively imposed either by State regulation or in the form of self-regulation by professional associations. However, the risk of regulatory capture has been a major concern since Stigler (1971). It has been argued that these arrangements raise prices and limit entry but fail to assure the appropriate quality of service, opening an intense debate among policy-makers on (de-)regulation policies.\footnote{See the OECD DAFFE/CLP(2000)2 report on “Competition in professional services” for a host of evidence on how anti-trust authorities have approached the issue in twelve countries in addition to the EU. See also Paterson et al. (2003).} In fact, since the landmark ruling of the US Supreme Court in 1975 on Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar there is an ever increasingly active application of antitrust laws in the professional services sector in all OECD countries.

The conventional wisdom argument about markets for professional services is based on asymmetric information: if at the time of contracting the quality is not observable by the customer, it actually may be the high quality services that are driven out of the market.\footnote{Uncertainty about service quality (Arrow, 1963) and the resulting adverse selection (Leland, 1979, Stiglitz, 1979, Wilson, 1979, 1980) and moral hazard (Shapiro, 1986) were modelled and understood some time ago.} Consequently, the main focus of policy debates is the correction of market failures due to informational asymmetries, and arguments are often based on the presumption that – in the absence of asymmetric information – a free market would perform efficiently. Asymmetric information is an important problem indeed. However, we contend that when customers can ascertain the quality of service before they purchase it, efficiency does not obtain either. Consequently, arguments about (de-)regulation policies deserve further scrutiny, abstracting from asymmetric information considerations.
In our model, the following fundamental features of markets for professional services are assumed: First, trade is decentralized. We develop our arguments in the context of a dynamic random matching market. Matching is random because we assume that the customers cannot tell the professionals apart before they choose who to approach. In other words, we model a market where reputation is not a major factor. In order to focus on the issues beyond asymmetric information, we assume that customers learn the quality of the service upon meeting a service provider. Second, the highly specialized and personalized service requires that each supplier serve only one customer at a time (making agreements on prices also bilateral). We model the resulting two-person bargaining with complete information using a simple strategic model, which can also be interpreted as the asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution.

We characterize the steady state of the market, and show that it leads to an inefficient outcome: there is an oversupply of (low) quality and in addition, for low enough delay costs, a queue will form and customers will suffer costly delay. Not even the removal of the per-period delay costs dissipates both these inefficiencies. While the quality distribution does converge to the efficient one, as the delay cost shrinks there is an ever larger queue of customers waiting to be served and the aggregate waiting cost is increasing.

We also show that regulatory policies using a single policy tool (such as setting minimal quality standards) can still only lead to second-best outcomes. Finally, we show that when a profession is allowed to self-regulate, welfare (and even Consumer Surplus) is increased relative to the a free market, whenever the inefficiency was caused by too many low quality providers in the market.

Given the importance of the issues at hand, there is surprisingly little theoretical literature around on professional markets (apart from the asymmetric information literature mentioned above). The inherently decentralized nature of the interaction has received little attention. Helmut Bester (1988, 1993) was the first to analyze a decentralized market with vertically differentiated sellers. While his model is a clear forbearer of ours, he allows a seller to sell to several buyers simultaneously and thus his model is not appropriate for the professional services industry (indeed, he does not explore the issue of self-regulation).

5The alternative assumption of directed search is equally valid but necessitates a markedly different model.
Recent contributions include Max Blouin (2003) who provides a simple model with no new entry after the first period. Rachel Kranton (2003) stresses the importance of competition between suppliers – and in general externalities among them – as an important factor determining the choice of the quality produced. Steven Davis (2001) has a labor market application within a search context. Finally, Morris Kleiner (2000) and Shirley Svorny (2000, 2004) provide some interesting survey results on licensing.

The rest of this article continues as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the details of our model, provide the tools to evaluate welfare in the free market and under the different regulatory regimes and discuss the first best allocation. Section 3 contains the analysis of the market equilibrium and addresses comparative statics (illustrated with numerical examples), measuring the impact of changes in the level of frictions and in bargaining power. We analyze the effect of minimum quality standards (licensing) in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A discusses the interpretation of the concept of competitive equilibrium in our market. The demonstrations omitted from the text are in Appendix B.

2 The model

We consider a market for a single commodity of heterogeneous quality, composed of a set of service providers (sellers) and a set of customers (buyers). The market operates over (discrete) time. Agents are risk neutral and maximize their (un-discounted) expected utility. Trade is carried out by decentralized agreements between buyer-seller pairs that meet randomly and negotiate the price to trade one unit of an indivisible good.

There is a continuum of buyers and sellers. The population of potential sellers is constant and has measure 1. Each seller is uniquely indexed by her type, \( \theta \in [0, 1] \). Seller \( \theta \) can produce a good of quality \( q(\theta) \), where \( q(\cdot) : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1] \) is assumed to be increasing.

For simplicity, we also assume that \( q(\cdot) \) is differentiable, \( q(0) = 0 \) and \( q(1) = 1 \). Note that \( q(\cdot) \) can also be thought of as the inverse of the distribution function of quality. We denote the average quality in the market when only goods above quality \( q(\theta^*) \) are produced by

\[ q^*(\theta) = \frac{1}{1 - \theta} \int_{\theta}^{1} q(\xi) \, d\xi. \]
\[ \bar{q}(\theta^*) = \frac{1}{1-\theta^*} \int_{\theta^*}^{1} q(x)dx. \]

Each seller can produce a single unit – which cannot be stored – in each period. The cost of production is independent of the quality\(^8\) and it is normalized to zero. We also assume, for simplicity, that the sellers’ human capital is fully specific to the market, and thus their opportunity cost of being in the market is zero. Sellers who (rationally) expect not to be able to sell at a positive price are supposed not to be present in the (steady state) market. Since a higher quality seller who trades can always do better than a lower quality one, the active sellers form an interval: \((\theta^*, 1]\).

In every period a measure 1 of new potential buyers appear. Before entering the market, these buyers are heterogeneous in terms of their outside opportunities,\(^9\) which are distributed according to the (strictly increasing and differentiable) distribution function \(E(.) : [-\infty, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]\).\(^{10}\) They must decide whether to enter the market. If they don’t, they take up their outside option and exit the model. As a result, the flow of buyers entering the market in each period is \(E(.)\) evaluated at the expected profit of a buyer upon entering the market (conditional on the measure of buyers entering simultaneously). We assume that \(-\int_{-\infty}^{0} x dE(x) < \infty\), that is, the aggregate “opportunity benefit” of the buyers entering in a given period is finite.\(^{11}\) In order to inform our intuition, it will be useful as we proceed to consider the homogeneous case of completely inelastic entry as well, where a measure \(e < 1\) of buyers enter each period (and suffer no opportunity cost). Once in the market, all buyers are identical: they wish to purchase a single unit of the good and their valuation of the good offered by seller \(\theta\) is equal to its quality, \(q(\theta)\). In every period that a buyer is in the market but does not get served he suffers a cost, \(c \in (0, 1]\).

In every period, traders seeking a match meet at random. We denote the probabilities of finding a trading counterpart by \(\pi_b\) and \(\pi_s\) for buyers and sellers, respectively. These probabilities depend on the state of the market, denoted by \((\theta^*, b^*)\). \(\theta^*\) is the marginal seller

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8Since one of our claims is that too much of mediocre quality is produced in equilibrium, by not giving mediocre producers a cost advantage, we actually strengthen our result.

9Alternatively, travel costs, either literally or in the sense of Hotelling.

10The presence of a positive measure of buyers with (very) negative opportunity costs is not absolutely necessary. However, otherwise for some parameter values a steady state equilibrium would fail to exist (see Subsection 3.1).

11Otherwise, welfare would be infinite, independent of the market outcome.
(so that $1 - \theta^*$ is the measure of active sellers in the market), while $b^*$ is the measure of buyers that seek a seller. There is efficient,\textsuperscript{12} uniform random matching among the active market participants: sellers receive a customer with probability $\pi_s = \min\left\{1, \frac{b^*}{1 - \theta^*}\right\}$ and buyers find an active seller with probability $\pi_b = \min\{1, \frac{1 - \theta^*}{b^*}\}$.

Once a buyer finds himself in a store, he learns the quality of the product offered by the seller. Next, they start bargaining over the price. Bargaining proceeds as follows. One of the parties is randomly selected to make a proposal. The probability that the buyer (the seller) is selected is $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ (respectively, $1 - \lambda$). If the responder accepts the proposed price, the transaction is consummated. The buyer then leaves the market, while the seller can serve a new customer in the following period. If the responder rejects, then they break up negotiations and both traders search for a new match in the following period.\textsuperscript{13}

We are interested in characterizing the market in its steady state, that is, when the measure of active traders in equilibrium, $b^*$ buyers and the sellers in $(\theta^*, 1]$, is constant over time. We will refer to such a situation as the *market equilibrium*.

\section*{2.1 Welfare}

In this subsection we develop the (utilitarian) welfare function, which will enable us to evaluate the efficiency of our market as well as to derive the optimal decisions of a (self-)regulatory authority.

In equilibrium,\textsuperscript{14} the measure of active sellers in each period is $1 - \theta^*$. Given the matching technology, everyone on the short side of the market is matched in each period, so – since, as we will see shortly, in equilibrium all matches end in trade – the measure of buyers entering the market in its steady state is the same as the measure of trade, \( t^* = \min\{b^*, 1 - \theta^*\} \) in each period.

\textsuperscript{12}Considering the frictionless limit is for simplicity; our analysis can be extended to environments where the matching technology displays search frictions.

\textsuperscript{13}Note that this bargaining procedure is an equilibrium outcome in a much more elaborate model, where following the random choice of the first proposer, there is an alternating offer bargaining game with either player being able to leave the negotiating table following a rejection. See Ponsatí and Sákovics (1998).

\textsuperscript{14}For ease of exposition, we define the welfare function directly for a market equilibrium.
The aggregate opportunity cost incurred by the buyers entering in a given period is thus
\[ E^{-1}(t^*) \int_{-\infty}^{x} x dE(x) = \int_{0}^{t^*} E^{-1}(x) dx. \]

Welfare per period is the realized surplus (quality weighted measure of trade) minus the opportunity and waiting costs:\(^{15}\)

\[ W = t^* \bar{q}(\theta^*) - \int_{0}^{t^*} E^{-1}(x) dx - (b^* - t^*) c. \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

When entry is inelastic, there is no opportunity cost to worry about:

\[ W(e) = e \bar{q}(\theta^*) - (b^* - e) c. \]

The professional college’s objective function can be derived along the same lines as the welfare function. Denote by \( p(\theta) \) the expected price that prevails in the \( q(\theta) \) bargaining pair. Then we have that the aggregate profits are given by

\[ \Pi = \frac{t^*}{1 - \theta^*} \int_{\theta^*}^{1} p(x) dx = t^* \bar{p}(\theta^*). \]

### 2.2 The efficient outcome

As a benchmark, it is useful to characterize the welfare-maximizing allocation — attainable under centralized trade with complete information — in our market.

**Proposition 1** The unconstrained welfare maximizing allocation results in a balanced market. The marginal trader, \( \theta^c \), is the solution of \( E(q(\theta^c)) = 1 - \theta^c \), and \( 1 - \theta^c \) buyers enter in each period. For exogenous entry the optimal allocation is given by \( \theta^c(e) = 1 - e \).

**Proof:** See Appendix B. •

Quite intuitively, the first best results in no idle traders, and the marginal consumer having an opportunity cost which equals the quality (surplus) provided by the marginal

\(^{15}\)Note that the expected number of periods a new entrant has to wait before getting served is \( \frac{1 - \pi_b}{\pi_b} \). Since \( \pi_b = \frac{t^*}{t^* - 1} \), we have that per entrant the expected waiting cost is \( \frac{t^*}{t^* - 1} - c \). Since there are \( t^* \) new entrants, the aggregate cost of waiting is \( (b^* - t^*) c \). This is the same as the cost of waiting incurred by the currently waiting buyers in any given period.
seller. See Figure 1. Note that unlike in the usual graph, the vertical axis measures buyer’s surplus, \( z := q(\theta) - p(\theta) \), rather than price. For a further elaboration on this, and on how we can derive this “competitive” allocation from first principles, see Appendix A.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Figure 1: Determining the buyer’s surplus in the competitive equilibrium.}
\end{align*}
\]

3 The market equilibrium

The characterization of the market equilibrium requires the simultaneous determination of the price distribution, \( p(\cdot) \), the marginal quality, \( q(\theta^*) \), and the measure of buyers active in the market, \( b^* \).

Consider a market equilibrium. Denote the expected surplus of a buyer upon entry by \( x_b \). This variable is central to the analysis, as it impacts on the outcome of bargaining and the entry decisions of traders on both sides of the market. The first result we want to establish is that every match will result in a trade. Note that, despite the fact that sellers who (rationally) expect not to be able to trade do not participate in the matching, we could have a situation where some buyers only agree to trade if they are chosen to make the first offer – and otherwise they prefer to wait for a new match.

**Lemma 1** In equilibrium every match results in trade. Moreover, the marginal quality is given by

\[
q(\theta^*) = \max \{x_b - c, 0\}. \tag{2}
\]
Proof: By stationarity, the buyers’ outside option during bargaining is the same as their expected surplus upon entry, but “discounted” by one period: $x_b - c$. This determines the marginal quality that is supplied in equilibrium, $q(\theta^*)$, in a straightforward way. Note that no buyer will ever purchase from a seller that offers a quality of $q(\theta) < x_b - c$, since even trade at zero price – the lowest price a seller would accept – would yield less than waiting for a rematch. Thus, potential sellers of quality below $x_b - c$ will not be active in a market equilibrium. On the other hand, a situation where the marginal quality offered in the market is $q(\theta^*) > \max\{x_b - c, 0\}$ cannot happen in a market equilibrium either. Otherwise, potential sellers of quality $q(\theta)$, $\max\{x_b - c, 0\} < q(\theta) < q(\theta^*)$, would enter the market and – if matched, which would happen with positive probability – make positive profits by trading at some expected price $p \in (0, q(\theta^*) - q(\theta))$, since any matched buyer is strictly better off trading at such prices than not trading. Hence, in a market equilibrium $q(\theta^*) = \max\{x_b - c, 0\}$. This, in turn, implies that all matches end in trade, since for $\theta' > \theta^*$, both traders are happy to trade for any $p \in (0, q(\theta') - q(\theta^*))$.

The endogenous outside option of a buyer is equal to the expected profits from a future match, net of the expected cost of waiting for that match. For a buyer the expected value attainable in future matches is independent of the quality of the good that he is currently bargaining for. Instead, it is a function of the distribution of quality effectively supplied in the market, and it coincides with the “discounted” value of the expected payoff of a buyer upon entry, $x_b - c$. Turning to the sellers, note that their outside option is zero, since the future sales are independent of what happens in this period, and upon disagreement with the buyer they are currently matched with, they have no further opportunity to sell in the current period.

In order to derive the (expected) outcome of bargaining, observe that in equilibrium all proposers offer the price that leaves the responder indifferent to his/her outside option. Therefore, the expected equilibrium price (as a function of quality) is given by

$$p(\theta) = (1 - \lambda)(q(\theta) - x_b + c).$$

\(\text{9} \)
Next, note that the expected surplus of a buyer upon entry satisfies

\[ x_b = \pi_b \int_{\theta^*}^{1} \frac{q(\theta) - p(\theta)}{1 - \theta^*} \, d\theta + (1 - \pi_b) (x_b - c). \tag{4} \]

To understand this equality, note that the buyer will either be matched and then obtains the expected difference between the quality of good she will buy and the price she will pay for it, or, she will be unmatched and will have to wait until next period to find herself in the same situation as now.

Substituting the price equation (3) into (4) and rearranging, we obtain\(^16\)

\[ x_b = \overline{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c(1 - \lambda \pi_b)}{\lambda \pi_b}. \tag{5} \]

Therefore, putting (5) and (2) together, we have identified our first equilibrium condition:

\[ q(\theta^*) = \max\left\{ \overline{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c}{\lambda \pi_b}, 0 \right\}. \tag{6} \]

Turning to the buyers’ entry decision, recall that in a steady state the measure of buyers entering and leaving (trading) must be equal. By Lemma 1, all matches lead to an exit, so the flow of buyers through the market equals \( t^* \). Thus, in general, \( E(x_b) = t^* \). Substituting in from (2), we obtain our second equilibrium condition

\[ q(\theta^*) = \max\left\{ E^{-1}(t^*) - c, 0 \right\}. \tag{7} \]

In order to simplify the analysis, we will assume that the distribution of quality is well-behaved: We say that the quality distribution is regular if \( \overline{q}'(\theta) < q'(\theta) \) for all \( \theta \in [0, 1] \). A sufficient\(^17\) condition for regularity is that \( q(.) \) is concave. Since \( q(.) \) is the inverse of the distribution function of quality, this roughly says that we should not have too many low quality potential sellers.

Let \( \theta_b(\lambda, c) \) be the unique (guaranteed by regularity) solution to

\[ \lambda [\overline{q}(\theta) - q(\theta)] = c, \tag{8} \]

\(^16\) A more intuitive way of writing (5) is \( x_b = \overline{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda \pi_b} - \frac{c(1 - \pi_b)}{\pi_b} \), where the second term on the right-hand side is the average price and the last term is the expected waiting cost of a new entrant.

\(^17\) But, by far, not necessary: the uniform quality distribution satisfies regularity by a wide margin, as \( \overline{q}(\theta) - q(\theta) = \frac{1 - \theta^2}{2} \).
when it exists (that is, when $\pi(0) \geq c/\lambda$), and zero otherwise. This equation determines the marginal seller if the sellers’ entry decision turns out to be the binding constraint. Note that in a buyers’ market (where buyers are the short side and, therefore, $\pi_b = 1$) the left-hand side is the expected gain to a buyer matched with the marginal seller from refusing to trade and waiting for a rematch, while the right-hand side is the cost of switching. If the gain were larger, then no buyer would be willing to trade with this seller, so she would not enter the market. Similarly, define $\theta_s(c)$ as the unique solution to

$$E(q(\theta) + c) = 1 - \theta. \quad (9)$$

This equation determines the marginal seller if the buyers’ entry decision turns out to be the binding constraint. The left-hand side gives us the measure of buyers willing to enter as a function of the marginal quality and the waiting cost (c.f. (7)). The right-hand side is the measure of active sellers, which in the market equilibrium has to equal the measure of new buyers entering the market.

We are now ready to state our characterization theorem:

**Theorem 1** Assume that $q(.)$ is regular. Then there exists a unique market equilibrium.

i) When $\theta_b(\lambda, c) \leq \theta_s(c)$, in equilibrium buyers are the short side, the marginal seller is $\theta_b(\lambda, c)$ and the measure of buyers in the market is $b_b = E[\pi_b - \frac{c(1-\lambda)}{\lambda}]$.

ii) When $\theta_b(\lambda, c) \geq \theta_s(c)$, in equilibrium sellers are the short side, the marginal seller is $\theta_s(c)$ and the measure of buyers in the market is $b_s = [\pi(\theta_s) - q(\theta_s)] \frac{\lambda(1-\theta_s)}{c}$.

**Proof:** See Appendix B. •

Similar arguments lead to the characterization of the market equilibrium when entry is exogenous:

**Corollary 1** Let $q(.)$ be regular and assume that buyers enter at a constant rate $e$. Then there is a unique market equilibrium.

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18 To be rigorous, if we do not want to use the additional information that $q(\theta) + c \leq 1$ before solving the equation, we need to extend the support of $E(.)$ up to 2: $E(x) \equiv 1$ for $x \in [1, 2]$.
1. For small entry rates, \( e \in (0, 1-\theta_b] \), buyers are the short side (\( b = e \)) and the marginal seller is \( \theta_b(\lambda, c) \).

2. For larger entry rates, \( e \in (1-\theta_b, 1) \), sellers are the short side (\( \theta^* = 1-e \)) and the measure of buyers in the market is \( b^* = (\bar{q}(1-e) - q(1-e)) \frac{\lambda e}{c} \).

3.1 The price distribution

In order to complete our description of the market equilibrium we need to establish how the surplus generated by trade is shared. Putting (3) and (5) together, we obtain the price distribution:

\[
p(\theta) = (1-\lambda)(q(\theta) - \bar{q}(\theta^*)) + \frac{c}{\lambda \pi_b}.
\]

That is, expected prices are linearly increasing in quality, with zero – by (6) – being paid for the good of the marginal producer (unless the marginal quality is zero, in which case the lowest price is \( p(0) = (1-\lambda)(\frac{c}{\lambda} - \bar{q}(0)) > 0 \)). Consequently, the sellers do obtain the share corresponding to their raw bargaining power, but not of the full surplus, rather of the incremental surplus over the one provided by the marginal seller. This is consistent with the fact that our bargaining equilibrium is equivalent to the (asymmetric) Nash Bargaining Solution, with the vector of outside options for the buyer and seller, \( (\bar{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c}{\lambda \pi_b}, 0) \), as the threat point and \( q(\theta) \) the size of the bargaining surplus.\(^{20}\) See Figure 2.

Note that the price at all supramarginal sellers is decreasing in the marginal quality, \( q(\theta^*) \). In other words, increased competition – additional (though lower quality) sellers active in the market – raises the prices earned by the incumbents. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the sellers’ entry is endogenous, implying that the marginal seller must expect zero in equilibrium, whoever she is. However, since the marginal quality is also endogenously determined, this result should not be evaluated at its face value. We will examine this question in more detail in Section 4, where we analyze the effects of the

\(^{19}\)For \( c/\lambda \) high enough to result in a negative buyer’s option \( (\bar{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c}{\lambda \pi_b} < 0) \), the price charged may exceed the quality provided. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the benefit to a buyer from trade is not just \( q(\theta) \) but also the avoidance of the waiting cost. Of course, this can only happen in equilibrium because, by assumption, there are buyers with negative enough opportunity costs who are still willing to enter the market. If this were not the case, the market would fail for \( c/\lambda \) high enough.

\(^{20}\)See Binmore et al. (1986) for a discussion of this equivalence.
introduction of a quality threshold – as a result of, say, occupational licensing – on the market equilibrium.

Condition (10) also allows us to make our first empirically relevant/testable observation.

**Proposition 2** If some (none) of the sellers are inactive, the “price-quality ratio”, \( \frac{p(\theta)}{q(\theta)} \), is strictly increasing (decreasing) in the quality of the good traded.

**Proof:** From (10) it is immediate that

\[
\frac{p(\theta)}{q(\theta)} = (1 - \lambda) \left[ 1 - \frac{\bar{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c}{\lambda \sigma_b}}{q(\theta)} \right],
\]

which – for \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \) – is strictly increasing (decreasing) \( q(\theta) \), as long as \( \bar{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c}{\lambda \sigma_b} > (<) 0 \).

From (6), this corresponds to whether, the marginal quality is positive or zero. •

That is, the proportion of the gains from trade appropriated by the sellers is increasing with the quality of their good as long as the buyers can expect a positive surplus. Since the latter condition is usually satisfied, this implies that the mark-up is increasing with quality, as is commonly observed. On the other hand, when the buyers expect a loss in the market (even if a smaller loss than what they would suffer outside), the result is the opposite, the
mark-up is decreasing with quality, as it is driven by a fixed effect. Again, this corresponds to the small(er) price dispersion observed, say, for emergency plumbing services.

At this point an example is useful to illustrate the mechanics of the market equilibrium and to preview the main points that we will be making in the sequel.

3.2 An Example

Consider a market where potential qualities are distributed uniformly in [0, 1], i.e. \( q(\theta) = \theta \), and assume that entry is given by 
\[
E(x) = \frac{1}{2-x^2}
\]

The efficient quality provision is given by
\[
\frac{1}{2-x^2} = 1 - x
\]

that yields \( \theta^c = .534 \). The first best level of welfare is thus
\[
W_{fb} = (1 - \theta^c)q(\theta^c) - \int_{1-\theta^c}^{0} E^{-1}(x)dx = (1-.534)(1+.534) - \int_{.466}^{0} (2 - \frac{1}{\sqrt{x}})dx = .357 + .434 = .791
\]

Let us fix the delay cost at, say, \( c = .1 \), and examine the market equilibrium for different values of the bargaining parameter \( \lambda \). Equation (8) yields \( \theta^b(c, \lambda) = 1 - \frac{2}{\lambda} \), which is positive for \( \lambda \geq .2 \). Equation (9) yields \( \theta^s(c) = .494 \), and 
\[
1 - \frac{2}{\lambda} \leq .494 \text{ if and only if } \lambda \leq .395
\]

Figure 3 displays \( \theta^s \) and \( \theta^b \) as a function of \( \lambda \). Thus, for \( c = .1 \), the market equilibrium is as follows:

1. For \( \lambda \leq .2 \) all sellers are active, \( \theta^* = 0 \), and the buyers are the short side; 
\[
b^* = \frac{10(1-\lambda)}{15-14\lambda}, \quad \text{and } \pi_s = \frac{10(1-\lambda)}{15-14\lambda} < 1
\]

2. For \(.2 < \lambda \leq .395 \) not all potential sellers are active, \( \theta^* = 1 - \frac{2}{\lambda} > 0 \), but buyers continue to be the short side; 
\[
b^* = \frac{10(1-\lambda)\lambda}{1+9(1-\lambda)\lambda}, \quad \text{and } \pi_s = \frac{50(1-\lambda)\lambda^2}{1+9(1-\lambda)\lambda} < 1
\]

3. For \( \lambda > .395 \) the marginal seller is \( \theta^* = .494 \), and sellers become the short side; 
\[
b^* = 1.28\lambda \text{ and } \pi_b = \frac{.395}{\lambda} < 1.
\]

The market equilibrium measures of active agents for each side of the market are displayed in Figure 4.

With these measures in hand, welfare, profits and consumer surplus as a function of \( \lambda \) are readily evaluated. The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 5 that presents welfare, consumer surplus and profits as a function of \( \lambda \), and displays the first best welfare (top horizontal line). It is apparent that allocating all the bargaining power to one side of
Figure 3: Marginal seller $\theta^s$ as a function of $\lambda$; $\theta^b$ is the flat line and $\theta^s$ is the increasing curve.

Figure 4: Equilibrium measures of buyers, $b^*$ (continuous line), and sellers, $1 - \theta^s$ (dashed line), as a function of $\lambda$. 
the market is not efficient. Furthermore, the maximum welfare (attained at the value of λ which balances the market) still falls short of the first best.

Figure 5: Welfare, consumer surplus and profits (top, middle and bottom curves) as a function of λ; the flat line displays the first best welfare.

Let us now fix the bargaining power at, say, λ = 1/2, and examine the market equilibrium for varying levels of the delay cost c. Equation (8) yields \( \theta^b(c, \lambda) = 1 - 4c \), which is positive for \( c \leq 1/4 \). Equation (9) is now the cubic equation \( \frac{1}{(2-x-c)^2} = 1 - x \). Its unique real solution, \( x(c) \), is displayed in Figure 6, along with \( 1 - 4c \); observe that, \( x(c) \) crosses \( 1 - 4c \) from below at \( c = .129 \).

Figure 6: Marginal seller \( \theta^* \) as a function of \( c \); \( \theta^*(c) = x(c) \leq \theta^b(c) = 1 - 4c \) for \( c \leq .129 \).

Thus, the market equilibrium for \( \lambda = 1/2 \) is as follows:

1. For \( c \leq .129 \) sellers are the short side and the marginal seller is \( \theta^* = x(c); b^* = \frac{(1-x(c))^2}{2c} \).
and \( \pi_b = \frac{2c}{1-x(c)} < 1 \).

2. For \(.129 < c \leq .25 \) buyers are the short side and the marginal seller is \( \theta^* = 1 - 4c \); \( b^* = \frac{1}{(1+3c)^2} \) and \( \pi_s = \frac{1}{(1+3c)^2} 4c < 1 \).

3. For \( c > .25 \) buyers are the short side with all potential sellers active; \( b^* = \frac{1}{(1.5+c)^2} \) and \( \pi_s = b^* < 1 \).

The measures of agents active on each side of the market as a function of \( c \) are displayed in Figure 7. Note that, as \( c \to 0, \theta^* \to \theta^c, b^* \to \infty \) and \( \pi_b \to 0 \).

![Figure 7: Measures of sellers, \( 1 - \theta^* \), and buyers, \( b^* \), as a function of \( c \).]

Thus, as delay costs vanish, the provision of quality approaches the efficient level. However, the measure of buyers that keeps the market at a steady state grows without bounds. In fact, this increase in the queue is faster than the decrease in the search cost. Figure 8, displays welfare, consumer surplus and profits as a function of \( c \), and relates them to the first best welfare; it is clear that efficiency is not attained in the limit. Indeed, at \( c = 0 \), welfare, profits and consumer surplus are all increasing in \( c \)! Again, the maximum welfare – attained at the value of \( c \) which balances the market – still falls short of the first best.

Before turning to the analysis of regulatory tools that might constrain and perhaps correct the market performance, in the next subsections we will argue that the equilibrium features and comparative statics displayed in this example hold in general.
3.3 Delay costs

Let us first investigate the behavior of the market equilibrium in general as the per period cost of delay, $c$, varies.

Let us first look at the imperfection caused indirectly by this friction: the deviation of the quality provided by the market from the efficient provision (given by the competitive allocation derived in the Section 2.2). As expected, since frictions “lock buyers in”, the market equilibrium always has too low marginal – and therefore average – quality. However, as (per period) frictions disappear, we obtain the competitive allocation:

**Proposition 3** The marginal quality in the market equilibrium is decreasing in $c$, and in the limit as (per period) frictions disappear, $c = 0$, it coincides with the competitive one.

**Proof:** Implicitly differentiating their defining equalities, it is easy to see that both $\theta_b(\lambda, c)$ and $\theta_s(c)$ are decreasing in $c$. Since $\lim_{c \to 0} \theta_b(\lambda, c) = 1$ for all $\lambda > 0$ (even if $q(.)$ is not regular!)\(^2\), as $c \to 0$ we always have a sellers’ market, and the marginal seller is $\theta_s(0)$, which coincides with $\theta^c$. •

\(^{21}\) Until it reaches zero. From then on it is, obviously, constant.

\(^{22}\) Note that this result does not require $q(.)$ to be regular, since as $c \to 0$ all the roots of $\bar{q}(\theta) - q(\theta) = c$ converge to 1 anyway.
It is important to observe that the convergence to the Walrasian outcome is not complete, though. Notably, the price distribution in the “frictionless” market does not match that of the competitive equilibrium. As we have seen, the latter leads to a constant buyer’s surplus: $q(\theta) - p_C(\theta) \equiv q(\theta^c)$, while the former is given by (7): $p(\theta) = (1 - \lambda) (q(\theta) - q(\theta^c))$, which leads to a buyer’s surplus increasing in quality: $q(\theta) - p(\theta) = \lambda q(\theta) + (1 - \lambda) q(\theta^c)$. Thus, the competitive price distribution corresponds to the frictionless market price distribution where almost all the bargaining power is given to the producers ($\lambda \approx 0$). For $\lambda > 0$, the buyer’s surplus is increasing in quality in the “frictionless” market equilibrium. This is at first blush surprising: if there are indeed no frictions, how come that a consumer matched with the marginal seller does not refuse to trade and wait for a better match? The explanation can be extracted from Theorem 1: the measure of buyers in the market, $b^*$, is increasing without bound as the buyers become more and more patient. As a result, the probability of getting rematched in the next period tends to zero as $c$ tends to zero.

Consequently, we do not achieve an efficient outcome even in the limit as (per period) delay cost disappear: while the quality distribution and the measure of new buyers entering the market are the same as in the competitive equilibrium, there exists an infinite queue and the buyers incur positive delay costs on average.

Actually, the limiting outcome is not only inefficient, but it is not even second-best. To see this, start by observing that once $c$ is low enough to put us in a sellers’ market, the expected payoff of a buyer upon entry, $x_b$, is increasing(!) in $c$.

**Corollary 2** In a sellers’ market, the expected payoff of a buyer upon entry, $x_b$, is increasing, while the expected payoff upon opting out from a match is decreasing, in the delay cost: $\frac{dx_b}{dc} > 0$, $\frac{d(x_b-c)}{dc} < 0$.

**Proof:** See Appendix B.

That is, as $c$ decreases, the effect on buyers who are in a match and on those who are not are divergent: while a buyer considering to leave the seller he is matched with will find it easier to switch (as expected), a buyer just entering the matching process will actually face a more costly wait! This latter phenomenon opens the possibility of welfare being increasing in the delay cost. That is, contrary to intuition, the more patient traders are in a
decentralized market the lower welfare they might enjoy! This is exactly what is displayed in Figure 8.

The explanation of the “paradox” has a taste of the tragedy of the commons: when buyers decide to enter the queue they do not take into account the negative externality imposed on the rest. As the cost of waiting decreases, during a transitory phase even more buyers enter the market. However, as we have seen above, this is accompanied by a decrease in the number of sellers, since now it is easier to switch away from a low quality seller. As a result the queue grows larger, eventually dissuading entry sufficiently so that it stabilizes at the level of the sellers present in the market. This means that we end up with fewer buyers entering per period than before, implying that the expected profit upon entry has decreased. Since prices have also decreased, the sellers are worse off as well. Thus – since by Proposition 3 and the fact that \( b \) (and thus the amount of trade) is decreasing in \( c \) when \( \theta_b = 0 \), welfare is always decreasing in \( c \) in a buyers’ market as well – we have proved that

**Proposition 4** The delay cost that maximizes welfare is not 0. Rather, it is \( c_w = E^{-1}(1 - \theta_b) - q(\theta_b) \), the delay cost that equates the number of buyers and sellers in the market.

At first blush, one might think that the above result is driven by the endogeneity of the buyers’ entry process. However, this is not the case, as we show next.

When entry is exogenous, a decrease in the delay cost will, obviously, have no effect on entry. Instead, initially it will decrease the number of sellers, since now it is cheaper to switch away from them. Since entry stays constant, this will result in a longer queue. Eventually, the queue will be sufficiently long, so that the expected payoff upon switching is the same as before and the marginal seller is the \( \theta = 1 - e \), once more. What has happened to welfare? Well, if \( x_b - c \) stayed constant while \( c \) decreased, it must be the case that \( x_b \) has decreased. Since production and prices are unchanged, this implies that welfare has also decreased. Consequently, Proposition 4 holds for exogenous entry as well.

Pulling all these results together, we can see that if the free market is a buyers’ market then a regulator would like to decrease waiting costs, since that would have two beneficial effects: it would increase the marginal quality and decrease the measure of idle sellers.

\(^{23}\)In the classic commons example this would correspond to a lower (private) cost of maintaining a goat.
On the other hand, if the free market is one where the consumers are queueing, then the
trade-off between improving the quality distribution and reducing waiting time is clearly
decided in favor of the latter. The importance of the cost of waiting in the evaluation of
social welfare is a recurrent and key observation in our analysis.

3.4 Bargaining power

When analyzing the effects of the distribution of bargaining power, the key observation to
make is that for any interior values of the parameters, varying $\lambda$ we can move the equilibrium
between a sellers’ and a buyers’ market. In a buyers’ market the marginal seller is increasing
in $\lambda$ – since the higher the buyers’ bargaining power the better is their outside option – ,
while no queues are formed. Consequently, since the original level of marginal quality was
too low, an increase in $\lambda$ will always lead to a welfare improvement. However, at some level
of $\lambda$ the market will turn into a sellers’ market. In a sellers’ market we have the opposite
situation. The marginal seller is independent of $\lambda$, while the queue length is increasing in
it (since the better deal a buyer can get the more waiting he is willing to put up with).
Consequently, welfare is decreasing in $\lambda$. As a result, we have the following:

**Proposition 5** The welfare maximizing (second best) bargaining power, $\lambda_w$, is the one
that leads to an equal number of buyers and sellers entering the market, if feasible: $\lambda_w = \min\{1, \frac{c}{q(\theta_s) - q(\theta_s)}\}$ (or $\min\{1, \frac{c}{q(1-e)/(1-e)}\}$, for exogenous entry).

Propositions 4 and 5 are two sides of the same coin. Together they demonstrate that the
welfare function always has a type of contract curve (that is, a locus of maxima) in $c$-$\lambda$ space
that forms a “ridge:” at any point along it welfare is maximized simultaneously in both $c$ and $\lambda$. This feature would indicate that the two “tools” are interchangeable. However,
the “ridge” also has the particularity that it can only “spend time” at one edge, the $\lambda = 1$
one. In other words, for any $\lambda$, we can find a low enough $c$ that puts us in a sellers’ market,
but not vice versa. This is illustrated in Figure 9 that displays the 3-dimensional picture of
welfare as a function of $c$ and $\lambda$ for the parameters of the example of section 3.2:

\footnote{Note that this does not imply that the level of welfare achieved along this curve is constant.}
4 Licensing

In this section we analyze the distributive and welfare effects of a minimal level of quality, \( q^* \), directly imposed by a (self-)regulator. Note that this quality threshold acts as a constraint on the market and therefore it necessitates a re-examination of the equilibrium behavior of the traders rather than “just” being a comparative statics exercise.

In Section 3 we have seen that not even the “frictionless” free market leads to the first best welfare. Since it does lead to the competitive level of quality supplied, this implies that, as a second best, the most efficient outcome in a “frictionless” market should involve a somewhat different marginal quality from the competitive one. Whether higher or lower, depends on how the expected cost of waiting varies with the marginal consumer. This is not obvious, since there are two effects at work – in opposite directions. On the one hand, increasing the marginal quality lowers the number of available sellers, so it increases the wait for a match. On the other hand, such an increase also decreases the surplus, which makes it possible to maintain the equilibrium entry rate with a shorter queue, which decreases the wait for a match. How this trade-off is decided is the first question we investigate.

Note that the expression for the buyers’ expected payoff upon entry, (5), is not affected
by the quality threshold. On the other hand the marginal quality is now given by

\[ q(\theta^*) = \max\{q^*, x_b - c, 0\}. \]

Assume that \( q^* > \max\{x_b - c, 0\} \), so that the quality threshold is binding (otherwise, it has no effect on the market equilibrium), and let \( \theta^* = q^{-1}(q^*) \). With a binding quality threshold the identity of the sellers active in the market is directly driven by the constraint. Consequently, the measure of buyers in the market is sufficient to characterize the equilibrium allocation:

**Proposition 6** When the quality threshold is binding, the measure of buyers in the market is given by

\[
\begin{align*}
    b^* &= \begin{cases} 
        E\left(\bar{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c(1-\lambda)}{\lambda}\right), & \text{if } E\left(\bar{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c(1-\lambda)}{\lambda}\right) \leq 1 - \theta^* \\
        \lambda(1-\theta^*)\left(\frac{\pi(\theta^*)}{c} - \frac{1}{e(1-\theta^*)}\right) + 1, & \text{otherwise.}
    \end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

**Proof:** See Appendix B. •

Turning to the price distribution, notice that it is still determined by (10). Using the queue length given by Proposition 6 we obtain:

**Corollary 3** In a sellers’ (buyers’) market, the prices at supramarginal sellers are increasing (decreasing) in a binding quality threshold.

In a buyers’ market, a rise in the marginal – and therefore the average – quality improves the buyers’ outside option, resulting in lower prices. In a sellers’ market there is a countervailing effect, which turns out to be the stronger one: the waiting time increases as a result of the restriction in supply. Consequently, prices increase.

When entry is exogenous we cannot have a binding quality constraint in a sellers’ market, since there would be too much entry for the market to stabilize. In a buyers’ market the trades are completely determined by the two constraints:

**Corollary 4** When the quality threshold is binding and entry is exogenous, the measure of buyers in the market is \( b^* = e \), while the measure of sellers is \( 1 - \theta^* \geq e \).

Turning to the socially optimal quality constraint, we have that:
Proposition 7  The welfare maximizing (binding) quality threshold is the one that equates the measure of buyers and sellers, determined by:

\[ E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*) = \bar{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda}, \]

for endogenous entry and \( \theta^* = \theta^c(e) = 1 - e \), for exogenous entry.

Proof:  See Appendix B.  □

In other words, when the unregulated market is a sellers’ market an imposed minimum quality cannot improve welfare.\(^{25}\) This has the important implication that licensing cannot alleviate the inefficiency caused by congestion (in a sellers’ market). On the other hand, if the unregulated market is a buyers’ market then there is room for improvement.

When entry is endogenous, the optimal threshold will be strictly below \( \theta^c \). The distortion from the competitive level of marginal quality is increasing in the friction (\( c \)) and decreasing in the buyers’ bargaining power (\( \lambda \)). When entry is exogenous, we can obtain (full) efficiency by imposing the optimal quality constraint.

In either scenario, if the regulator were able to set both the bargaining power and a quality threshold, the first best outcome could be guaranteed:\(^{26}\)

Corollary 5  For any \( c \in (0, 1] \), there exists a \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \), such that setting the quality threshold at the efficient level the market equilibrium leads to the competitive outcome.

Proof:  See Appendix B.  □

When the (aggregate) profit-maximizing college can set the quality standard, we have that the quality threshold is determined independently of the bargaining powers:

Proposition 8  When entry is endogenous, the profit maximizing quality threshold always results in a sellers’ market. If interior, this marginal quality satisfies

\[ q(\theta^*) + c = E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*) - (1 - \theta^*) \frac{dE^{-1}(1 - \theta^*)}{d\theta^*}. \]

\(^{25}\)Interestingly, a constraint imposing a maximum on the marginal quality would help, but it would be rather difficult to implement (possibly with a lower bound imposed on number of licensees?).

\(^{26}\)Because of our restriction that the per period cost cannot exceed the maximum quality, setting the delay cost (and the marginal quality) may not be sufficient to achieve the first best.
Note that the second term on the right-hand side is positive, and that if it were zero, the solution of the first-order condition would coincide with the unregulated outcome. That is, when the solution is interior, we have that self-regulation will be welfare improving as long as – the unregulated outcome is a buyers’ market and – entry is not too inelastic. In fact, for some environments the minimal quality set by the college can be beneficial for the buyers as well. Figure 10 displays welfare, consumer surplus and profits (top, middle and bottom curves) as a function of the minimum quality standard for an environment where licensing by the college increases Consumer Surplus.

Figure 10: The profit maximizing minimal quality can lead to an improvement for both sides.

As we have seen above, exogenous entry is not compatible with a binding quality constraint in a sellers’ market. Since in a buyers’ market prices are decreasing, while the amount of trade stays constant, have that

**Corollary 6** When entry is exogenous, the college prefers not to impose a quality threshold.

**Proof:** See Appendix B.

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27 In this latter case, the marginal quality may be set so high that welfare is below the one that would result in the unregulated market.

28 The corresponding parameters are: \( c = .2, \lambda = .5, E(x) = 1/(2 - x)^5, q(\theta) = \theta. \)
5 Conclusions

We have shown that in a decentralized market for professional services there is a need for public intervention even in the absence of asymmetric information about the quality at the point of service. The equilibrium outcome involves excess supply (too low marginal quality) and possibly excess demand (queuing customers) relative to the first best. As excess demand is inversely proportional to the unit cost of delay, the inefficiency is robust to the elimination of frictions (delay costs): while excess supply disappears, we have permanent excess demand in the limit.

From a welfare maximizing point of view, the avoidance of delay costs turns out to be more important than the optimal quality mix being provided. Thus, the optimal quality threshold will never increase the queues even if that would result in a better quality distribution. Since the queue increases in the quality threshold, this also means that if there is a queue in the unregulated market, minimum quality standards will not be able to improve welfare. Under self-regulation, since the professional college is only indirectly affected by the queuing costs it restricts entry excessively compared to the social optimum (thereby, in general, creating queues), however not necessarily relative to the unregulated outcome. The more elastic is the consumers’ entry condition (distribution of opportunity costs) the better is the college’s optimal decision for welfare.\footnote{Note that, if the bargaining took place under asymmetric information, the college would have an additional reason to increase licensing standards, so the social value of self-regulation would be further increased.}

For brevity’s sake, we have not analyzed a number of additional regulatory tools. For example, we have not analyzed the effects of price fixing. It is rather straightforward that if it were feasible to set a price schedule then \( p(\theta) = q(\theta) - q(\theta^c) \) would guarantee the first best. However, in practice it is not realistic to assume that such a price schedule can be implemented. A constant price imposed on the entire market should still lead to an improvement as forcing the price to be the same at all sellers gives a stronger incentive to switch away from a low quality seller, thereby increasing the marginal quality.

Other interesting generalizations include the case where the opportunity cost of the sellers is positive – capturing the effect of a costly investment (training) – or the effects of a license fee either imposed on everyone or on newcomers only. Our model is clearly
well-suited as a workhorse for such further analyses.

6 Appendix A

In order to provide further insight, we would like to arrive at the competitive allocation from first principles as well. In the current context, this is non-trivial for two reasons.

First, since our set-up is dynamic – where in each period new participants enter the market –, in order to construct supply and demand we cannot just take a snapshot of the stock of traders present in the market. Rather, we have to look at all the traders who could potentially enter the market at any point in time.\textsuperscript{30} By stationarity, and following Gale (1987), the maximizer of the discounted sum of surplus is the same as that of the (per-period) flow of potential traders. In our model the demand flow is given by the \textit{new} buyers who could potentially enter in each period, while the supply flow is given by all the sellers who could potentially produce in each period. That is, we can identify the competitive allocation by looking at the demand and supply that is newly generated in each period.

The second difficulty stems from the fact that we are not dealing with a homogeneous good, rather with a (vertically) differentiated one. As a result, the Law of One Price turns into the Law of One Surplus: Since the products are differentiated, consumers do not simply compare prices when deciding which seller to buy from. Rather, they evaluate different products according to the surplus they can obtain from their consumption.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, in a competitive market it is the buyer’s surplus available, which determines both whether a buyer enters the market, and if yes, from which seller does he purchase. Then in a competitive \textit{equilibrium}, we must have – for the usual reasons – the buyer’s surplus, \( z(\theta) = q(\theta) - p(\theta) \), constant across sellers. Thus, the quantity demanded (per period) – as a function of the “market buyer’s surplus” – is \( E(z) \). The supply function – again as a function of \( z \) – can be constructed from the constraint that no seller would be willing to sell below cost, that is, we must have \( q(\theta) \geq z \) for each active seller. This implies that if they have to offer \( z \) to the consumers, only sellers above \( \theta = q^{-1}(z) \) will be willing to sell, leading to a

\textsuperscript{30}Strictly speaking, what we need to look at is the (discounted) “sum” of potential entrants.

\textsuperscript{31}Given the indivisibility inherent in a service being provided, we cannot remedy this problem by simply converting to a unit price of quality.
supply of $1 - q^{-1}(z)$. Inverting supply and demand the Marshallian way, we obtain that the quantity traded (per period) in the competitive equilibrium, $Q$, solves $q(1 - Q) = E^{-1}(Q)$, which yields the marginal trader, $\theta^c$, as the solution to $q(\theta^c) = E^{-1}(1 - \theta^c)$, just as when we directly maximize welfare (in Proposition 1). Finally, note that the Walrasian buyer’s surplus equals the marginal quality, $z = q(\theta^c)$.

7 Appendix B

Proof of Proposition 1:

Assume $t^* = b^*$. Then (1) is clearly increasing in $\theta^*$, so at the optimum $b^* = 1 - \theta^*$. Similarly, if $t^* = 1 - \theta^*$ (1) decreasing in $b^*$ so at the optimum $b^* = 1 - \theta^*$. Consequently, at the optimum we must have $t^* = b^* = 1 - \theta^*$. Substituting in and differentiating (1) with respect to $\theta^*$ we obtain the first-order condition

$$-q(\theta^*) + (1 - \theta^*) q'(\theta^*) + E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*) = 0.$$  

Noting that $q'(\theta^*) = q(\theta_s) - q(\theta_s) 1 - \theta^*$ yields

$$E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*) = q(\theta^*)$$

as claimed (the second-order condition is trivially satisfied).

When entry is exogenous, we have the feasibility constraints that $e \leq b^*$ and $e \leq 1 - \theta^*$. Since $W(e)$ is increasing in $\theta^*$ and decreasing in $b^*$ the result follows.

Proof: Let us look at the two possible market scenarios – buyers’ and sellers’ markets – separately.

Sellers are the short side: $b \geq 1 - \theta^* = t^*$.

In this scenario (7) implies that $E(q(\theta_s) + c) = 1 - \theta_s$, which – as we have seen above – has $\theta_s(c)$ as its unique solution. Using this equation and substituting (5) into $E(x_b) = t^* = 1 - \theta^*$ we have

$$q(\theta_s) + c = E^{-1}(1 - \theta_s) = \bar{q}(\theta_s) - \frac{c(1 - \lambda \pi_b)}{\lambda \pi_b}.$$  

\footnote{Note that if $q(\theta^*)$ were 0, then (7) would imply that $E^{-1}(1) - c \leq 0$. Since $E^{-1}(1) = 1$ this is equivalent to $c \leq 1$. Therefore, $1 \geq c$ implies that we need not take the positive parts in (7).}
In a sellers’ market, buyers are not always matched: \( \pi_b = \frac{1-\theta_s}{b_s} < 1 \). Substituting in, we obtain

\[
q(\theta_s) + c = \mathcal{Q}(\theta_s) - \frac{c(b_s - \lambda(1 - \theta_s))}{\lambda(1 - \theta_s)}.
\]

Solving for \( b_s \), we obtain

\[
b_s = \frac{(\mathcal{Q}(\theta_s) - q(\theta_s)) \lambda(1 - \theta_s)}{c}.
\]  \hspace{1cm} (12)

Recall that the sellers’ market solution obtains if and only if \( b_s \geq 1 - \theta_s \). It is easy to see that \( \lambda[\mathcal{Q}(\theta_s) - q(\theta_s)] = c \) is the same as (12) with \( b_s \) replaced by \( 1 - \theta_s \). Therefore, since by the regularity of \( q(.) \), \( \mathcal{Q}(\theta_s) - q(\theta_s) \) is decreasing in \( \theta_s \), \( b_s \geq 1 - \theta_s \) if and only \( \theta_s \leq \theta_b \).

**Buyers are the short side:** \( b = t^* \leq 1 - \theta^* \).

Now all the buyers get matched in every period, so \( \pi_b = 1 \). Substituting back into (6), we obtain \( q(\theta_b) = \max \{ q(\theta_b) - \frac{c}{\lambda}, 0 \} \), which – as we have seen above – has \( \theta_b(\lambda, c) \) as its unique solution. In the buyers’ market, substituting (5) into \( E(x_b) = t^* = b_b \) we obtain

\[
b_b = E \left( \mathcal{Q}(\theta_b) - \frac{c(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda} \right). \hspace{1cm} (13)
\]

This equilibrium prevails if and only if \( b_b \leq 1 - \theta_b \). When \( \theta_b = 0 \), the inequality is satisfied, since \( E(.) \) is a probability distribution function. Otherwise, by (6), \( \mathcal{Q}(\theta_b) - \frac{c(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda} = q(\theta_b) + c \), so \( b_b = E(q(\theta_b) + c) \). Recall that \( \theta_s(c) \) denotes the unique solution to \( 1 - \theta = E(q(\theta) + c) \). Then, by the increasing nature of \( E(.) \) and \( q(.) \), we have that the buyers’ equilibrium exists if and only if \( \theta_b \leq \theta_s(c) \).

**Proof of Corollary 2:**

From (5) we have that in a sellers’ market

\[
x_b = \mathcal{Q}(\theta_s) - \frac{c(b^*/(1 - \theta_s) - \lambda)}{\lambda}.
\]

Substituting in for \( b^* \) from Theorem 1 and simplifying, we obtain

\[
x_b = q(\theta_s) + c.
\]

Differentiating and calculating \( \frac{\partial \theta}{\partial c} \) by implicitly differentiating \( E(q(\theta_s) + c) = 1 - \theta_s \), we obtain

\[
\frac{dx_b}{dc} = \frac{-q'(\theta_s)E'(q(\theta_s) + c)}{1 + q'(\theta_s)E'(q(\theta_s) + c)} + 1 > 0.
\]
Similarly,
\[ \frac{d(x_b - c)}{dc} = \frac{-q'(\theta_s)E'(q(\theta_s) + c)}{1 + q'(\theta_s)E'(q(\theta_s) + c)} < 0. \]

\[ \bullet \]

**Proof of Proposition 6:**

**Sellers are the short side:** \( b^* > 1 - \theta^* = E(x_b) \).

In this scenario, \( \pi_b \equiv \frac{1-\theta^*}{b^*} \). Moreover, \( x_b = E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*) \). Equation (5) translates into
\[ E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*) = \overline{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c(b^* - \lambda(1 - \theta^*))}{\lambda(1 - \theta^*)}. \]

Solving for \( b^* \), we obtain
\[ b^* = \lambda(1 - \theta^*) \left( \frac{\overline{q}(\theta^*) - E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*)}{c} + 1 \right). \]  
(14)

Then we have that the sellers’ market solution obtains if and only if
\[ 1 - \theta^* < \lambda(1 - \theta^*) \left( \frac{\overline{q}(\theta^*) - E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*)}{c} + 1 \right). \]  
(15)

**Buyers are the short side:** \( b^* = E(x_b) \leq 1 - \theta^* \).

In this case all the buyers get matched in every period, so \( \pi_b \equiv 1 \). Substituting back to (5), we obtain
\[ E^{-1}(b^*) = \overline{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda}. \]  
(16)

For this to be the equilibrium we need
\[ E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*) \geq \overline{q}(\theta^*) - \frac{c(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda}. \]  
(17)

Notice that this inequality is the complement of (15).

\[ \bullet \]

**Proof of Proposition 7:**

Note that there exists a threshold value of \( \theta^* \), such that below it we are in a buyers’ market while above it we are in a sellers’ market. Assume first, that we are in a buyers’ market. From (1) we have that
\[ \frac{dW}{d\theta^*} = b^*\overline{q}'(\theta^*) + \frac{db^*}{d\theta^*} \left[ \overline{q}(\theta^*) - E^{-1}(b^*) \right]. \]
The first term is clearly positive, since the average quality is increasing in the marginal
one. Since we are in a buyers’ market $E(\theta^*)$ is the expected surplus of a buyer, which
is less than the average quality as well (c.f. (16)). Consequently, all we need in order to
derive

$$E - 1(b^*) \text{ is the expected surplus of a buyer, which is less than the average quality as well (c.f. (16)). Consequently, all we need in order to complete this part of the proof is to show that in a buyers’ market } dE^* d\theta^* \geq 0. \text{ That trivially follows from Proposition 6, since both } E(\theta^*) \text{ and the average quality are increasing in } \theta^*.$$ 

Consequently, welfare is increasing in a (binding) quality constraint. That is, the planner
would like $\theta^*$ as large as possible, while it still results in a buyers’ market.

Turning to the sellers’ market, we have

$$dW d\theta^* = \left\{ (1 - \theta^*)q'(\theta^*) - \int_0^{1 - \theta^*} E^{-1}(x)dx - \left( \lambda(1 - \theta^*)\left( \frac{\pi(\theta^*) - E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*) + 1}{c} \right) - (1 - \theta^*) \right) c \right\}$$

$$= (1 - \theta^*)q'(\theta^*) - \pi(\theta^*) + E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*) - c(1 - \lambda) + \lambda \left( \pi(\theta^*) - E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*)\right) - \lambda(1 - \theta^*) \left( q'(\theta^*) - \frac{dE^*(1 - \theta^*)}{d\theta^*} \right)$$

$$= \left\{ (1 - \theta^*)q'(\theta^*) - \pi(\theta^*) - c + E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*)) \right\} (1 - \lambda) - \frac{\lambda(1 - \theta^*)}{E^*(E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*))}$$

where we have used that $q'(\theta^*) = \frac{\pi(\theta^*) - \pi(\theta^*)}{1 - \theta^*}$. This derivative is clearly negative, since the fact that the quality constraint is binding implies that the term in the square brackets is negative.

**Proof of Corollary 5:**

It is straightforward that if we set the quality threshold at the efficient quality and the
market happens to clear in such a way that the measure of sellers and buyers in the market
is the same – and therefore there is no inefficiency caused either by waiting or by too low
demand – we have the first best outcome. Consequently, all we need to prove is that it is
possible to set $\lambda$ in order to ensure that the market indeed clears in that way. Recall that
the producer of the efficient marginal quality – given by the solution to $q(\theta) = E^{-1}(1 - \theta)$, – is independent of both $\lambda$ and $c$. On the other hand, by Proposition 6, we have a symmetric
market when $E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*) = \pi(\theta^*) - c(1 - \lambda) \lambda$. Using the equality defining the optimal marginal producer, means that we need $q(\theta^c) = \pi(\theta^c) - \frac{c(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda}$ or $\pi(\theta^c) - q(\theta^c) = \frac{c(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda}$. The left-hand side of this last equation is a number in $(0,1)$. Thus the proof boils down to showing that

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for any $c \in (0,1]$, any number in $(0,1)$ can be achieved by a judiciously choosing a $\lambda \in [0,1]$. This is indeed the case, since $\frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda}$ is decreasing from $\infty$ to 1 in $\lambda$.

**Proof of Proposition 8:**

If we are in a sellers’ market, by (3), the aggregate profits are given by

$$\pi = (1 - \lambda) \int_{\theta^*}^{1} [q(\theta) - x_{b} + c] \, d\theta.$$  

Recall that $x_{b} = E^{-1}(1 - \theta^*)$. Substituting into the profit function and differentiating, we obtain the first-order condition.

In a buyers’ market not all sellers get matched, so

$$\pi = \frac{b^{*}}{1 - \theta^{*}} (1 - \lambda) \int_{\theta^{*}}^{1} [q(\theta) - q(\theta^{*}) + \xi] \, d\theta,$$

where we used $x_{b} = E^{-1}(b^{*})$ and $b^{*} = E \left( q(\theta^{*}) - \frac{c(1-\lambda)}{\lambda} \right)$. Integrating and simplifying, we get

$$\pi = E \left( q(\theta^{*}) - \frac{c(1-\lambda)}{\lambda} \right) (1 - \lambda) c/\lambda.$$  

Since the average quality is increasing in the marginal producer, the college will never want to be in a buyers’ market.

**Proof of Corollary 6:**

Aggregate profits are given by

$$\frac{e}{1 - \theta^{*}} (1 - \lambda) \int_{\theta^{*}}^{1} \left[ q(\theta) - \bar{q}(\theta^{*}) + \frac{c}{\lambda} \right] \, d\theta = e(1 - \lambda) \frac{c}{\lambda},$$

which is clearly constant in the marginal quality.

**References**


